Viewing profile — FiloSottile
FiloSottile
HN member- Joined
- Wed, May 09, 2012, 7:10 AM UTC
- HN karma
- 10,854
- Public activity
- 850 items
- HN profile
- View on Hacker News ↗
About FiloSottile
[ my public key: https://keybase.io/filippo; my proof: https://keybase.io/filippo/sigs/c51KtcfccPH0D3jG9PtQBZZh6AqhvB5MHIz2YmkupAc ]
Recent public activity
-
comment
Comment #48989576
Oooof, thank you for catching this. This is what I get for writing spec and API before the implementation (which, to be fair, is usually the right order not to lose sight of the br…
-
comment
Comment #48659440
> I understand people are getting slammed and it sucks, but the main result of rejecting them is going to be an increase in full disclosure. Right, what I'm saying is that letting …
-
comment
Comment #48657404
Thanks for the comment, I was actually hoping to get your take on this! I linked to it from the article. > Still on Hacker News, Juho Forsén, one of the most prolific reporters of …
- story
-
comment
Comment #48571921
Uh, yeah, this is not the writing of someone with the experience to maintain a cryptography toolkit: https://kerkour.com/nist-cryptography-backdoor (I’m more worried about judgemen…
-
comment
Comment #48562651
TIL about ZFSBootMenu! Still, the whole frood system is significantly less complex than ZFSBootMenu alone.
-
comment
Comment #48484482
I’m pretty sure (even just based on the revenue of various SaaS products) that’s not typical, hence “most NDAs”. I’m also sure some require a SCIF, but that’s not most of them.
-
comment
Comment #48484143
Your NDAs prohibit emailing a colleague about the e.g. project, or discussing it in a Slack DM with the client, or tracking progress on it in JIRA? You have to do NDA’d work exclus…
-
comment
Comment #48483956
In the same way that using Gmail and Dropbox and iCloud and Notion violates it. (Which IANAL but for most NDAs would be not at all.)
-
comment
Comment #48246511
I would really like to look at the bug and whether we could have caught it with conventional testing, but it doesn't look like Apple actually disclosed it?
-
comment
Comment #47843488
I just use the VS Code git integration with the jj colocated git repo. HEAD is @- and the changes in @ are considered working copy changes. It works for all I was using the VS Code…
-
comment
Comment #47841911
This will probably not help enough for asymmetric keys, and is unnecessary for symmetric keys. https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.28846 claims an attack runtime of a few minutes. There are…
-
comment
Comment #47841859
The calculated DW cost of the quantum attack is 2^104 (with conservative/optimistic assumptions and ignoring the physical cost of a single logical gate), which is "much more realis…
-
comment
Comment #47838744
Hashes are symmetric cryptography primitives, and it's even proper to talk about key sizes for e.g. HMAC and HKDF hash-based constructions, to which Grover's algorithm applies anal…
-
comment
Comment #47669665
The world just doesn’t work in such a binary way. Forming a mental model of an entity’s incentives, goals, capabilities, and dysfunctions will serve you much better than making two…
-
comment
Comment #47668636
> KyberSlash That's a timing side-channel, irrelevant to ephemeral key exchanges, and tbh if that's the worst that went wrong in a year and a half, I am very hopeful indeed.
-
comment
Comment #47667934
I mean "your OS and have a CRQC" because they will need to compromise the software PQ key by compromising the OS, and derive the hardware YubiKey private key using the CRQC.
-
comment
Comment #47667779
Thus succeeding at making the telecommunications vendors used for Top Secret US national security data less secure, the obvious goal of the US National Security Agency, and the onl…
-
comment
Comment #47667475
TIL about the Chicago Pile! (I don't know enough about the physics to tell if it could have indeed exploded.) > On 2 December 1942 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chicago_Pile-1 > on…
-
comment
Comment #47667296
If you are doing authentication with those hardware keys, you will probably be fine, if we do our job fast enough. Apple's Secure Enclave already supports some PQ signatures (altho…
-
comment
Comment #47667204
> The industry standard and general recommendation for quantum resistant symmetric encryption is using 256 bit keys It simply is not. NIST and BSI specifically recommend all of AES…
-
comment
Comment #47665877
DES is the algorithms that was secretly modified by the NSA to protect it against differential cryptanalysis. Capping a key size is hardly a "backdoor." Also, that was the time of …
-
comment
Comment #47665831
> from a classical security point of view PQC cannot be trusted [citation needed] https://words.filippo.io/crqc-timeline/#fn:lattices
-
comment
Comment #47665706
We can disagree on the tradeoff, but if you see no upside, you are missing the velocity cost of the specification work, the API design, and the implementation complexity. Plus the …
-
comment
Comment #47665639
We are stretching the metaphor thin, but surely the progress towards an atomic bomb was not measured only in uranium production, in the same way that the progress towards a QC is n…