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FiloSottile

HN member
Joined
Wed, May 09, 2012, 7:10 AM UTC
HN karma
10,854
Public activity
850 items

About FiloSottile

https://filippo.io

[ my public key: https://keybase.io/filippo; my proof: https://keybase.io/filippo/sigs/c51KtcfccPH0D3jG9PtQBZZh6AqhvB5MHIz2YmkupAc ]

Recent public activity

  1. comment
    Comment #48989576

    Oooof, thank you for catching this. This is what I get for writing spec and API before the implementation (which, to be fair, is usually the right order not to lose sight of the br…

  2. comment
    Comment #48659440

    > I understand people are getting slammed and it sucks, but the main result of rejecting them is going to be an increase in full disclosure. Right, what I'm saying is that letting …

  3. comment
    Comment #48657404

    Thanks for the comment, I was actually hoping to get your take on this! I linked to it from the article. > Still on Hacker News, Juho Forsén, one of the most prolific reporters of …

  4. story
  5. comment
    Comment #48571921

    Uh, yeah, this is not the writing of someone with the experience to maintain a cryptography toolkit: https://kerkour.com/nist-cryptography-backdoor (I’m more worried about judgemen…

  6. comment
    Comment #48562651

    TIL about ZFSBootMenu! Still, the whole frood system is significantly less complex than ZFSBootMenu alone.

  7. comment
    Comment #48484482

    I’m pretty sure (even just based on the revenue of various SaaS products) that’s not typical, hence “most NDAs”. I’m also sure some require a SCIF, but that’s not most of them.

  8. comment
    Comment #48484143

    Your NDAs prohibit emailing a colleague about the e.g. project, or discussing it in a Slack DM with the client, or tracking progress on it in JIRA? You have to do NDA’d work exclus…

  9. comment
    Comment #48483956

    In the same way that using Gmail and Dropbox and iCloud and Notion violates it. (Which IANAL but for most NDAs would be not at all.)

  10. comment
    Comment #48246511

    I would really like to look at the bug and whether we could have caught it with conventional testing, but it doesn't look like Apple actually disclosed it?

  11. comment
    Comment #47843488

    I just use the VS Code git integration with the jj colocated git repo. HEAD is @- and the changes in @ are considered working copy changes. It works for all I was using the VS Code…

  12. comment
    Comment #47841911

    This will probably not help enough for asymmetric keys, and is unnecessary for symmetric keys. https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.28846 claims an attack runtime of a few minutes. There are…

  13. comment
    Comment #47841859

    The calculated DW cost of the quantum attack is 2^104 (with conservative/optimistic assumptions and ignoring the physical cost of a single logical gate), which is "much more realis…

  14. comment
    Comment #47838744

    Hashes are symmetric cryptography primitives, and it's even proper to talk about key sizes for e.g. HMAC and HKDF hash-based constructions, to which Grover's algorithm applies anal…

  15. comment
    Comment #47669665

    The world just doesn’t work in such a binary way. Forming a mental model of an entity’s incentives, goals, capabilities, and dysfunctions will serve you much better than making two…

  16. comment
    Comment #47668636

    > KyberSlash That's a timing side-channel, irrelevant to ephemeral key exchanges, and tbh if that's the worst that went wrong in a year and a half, I am very hopeful indeed.

  17. comment
    Comment #47667934

    I mean "your OS and have a CRQC" because they will need to compromise the software PQ key by compromising the OS, and derive the hardware YubiKey private key using the CRQC.

  18. comment
    Comment #47667779

    Thus succeeding at making the telecommunications vendors used for Top Secret US national security data less secure, the obvious goal of the US National Security Agency, and the onl…

  19. comment
    Comment #47667475

    TIL about the Chicago Pile! (I don't know enough about the physics to tell if it could have indeed exploded.) > On 2 December 1942 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chicago_Pile-1 > on…

  20. comment
    Comment #47667296

    If you are doing authentication with those hardware keys, you will probably be fine, if we do our job fast enough. Apple's Secure Enclave already supports some PQ signatures (altho…

  21. comment
    Comment #47667204

    > The industry standard and general recommendation for quantum resistant symmetric encryption is using 256 bit keys It simply is not. NIST and BSI specifically recommend all of AES…

  22. comment
    Comment #47665877

    DES is the algorithms that was secretly modified by the NSA to protect it against differential cryptanalysis. Capping a key size is hardly a "backdoor." Also, that was the time of …

  23. comment
    Comment #47665831

    > from a classical security point of view PQC cannot be trusted [citation needed] https://words.filippo.io/crqc-timeline/#fn:lattices

  24. comment
    Comment #47665706

    We can disagree on the tradeoff, but if you see no upside, you are missing the velocity cost of the specification work, the API design, and the implementation complexity. Plus the …

  25. comment
    Comment #47665639

    We are stretching the metaphor thin, but surely the progress towards an atomic bomb was not measured only in uranium production, in the same way that the progress towards a QC is n…